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INTRODUCTION: RULING THE WORLD 
Steven A. Dean* & Claire R. Kelly** 
s recent events have taught us, globalization demands that we 
consider not just the national, but also the worldwide, implica-
tions of regulatory shortcomings of all sorts. There is no single country 
with the power to impose its legal framework throughout the world. Just 
as important, no country operates in legal or regulatory isolation. Legal 
failures and their consequences cross borders, sometimes in spectacular 
fashion. National economies have never been more interconnected. 
Norm entrepreneurs work to connect the legal frameworks that guide 
and constrain behavior within these economies. International legal norms 
not only facilitate economic interaction among States and nonstate actors 
from different parts of the world, but also foster stability, predictability, 
and prosperity. Even isolated rule failures have the potential to reverbe-
rate throughout the world. A less visible, but no less troubling, reality is 
that where legal vacuums arise, opportunities go wanting. 
A host of organizations, communities, and groups have stepped for-
ward to generate norms that shape conduct across borders. The subject of 
this Symposium is how these entities manage the alchemical trick of 
turning chaos into order despite daunting legal, philosophical, practical, 
and cultural impediments. We focus on the development of international 
norms in the private law context, a process that can be contentious and 
even frustrating. The Symposium explores different models for the crea-
tion of international legal norms, including, but not limited to, institu-
tional regulation, private legislators, model treaties, legislative guides, 
and transnational harmonization. 
Of course, government actors have not abandoned the field. In fact, 
different lawmaking bodies compete with each other for relevance. States 
and domestic rule-makers vie for influence while interest groups hope to 
direct lawmaking activities. When norms do take root and blossom into 
soft or hard law, the interrelated problems of compliance and legitimacy 
bedevil would-be enforcers. This Symposium Issue explores these con-
cerns and many others by considering three case studies: commercial 
law, taxation, and financial regulation. We are fortunate to have a diverse 
lineup of experts from all over the world to examine these issues. 
In Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International Context, Ro-
derick A. Macdonald, F.R. Scott Professor of Constitutional and Public 
Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University, frames our discussion of inter-
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national norm development using three metaphors: harmonization, trans-
plantation, and viral propagation. Each of these metaphors reveals de-
fects in universal norm generation and highlights the fallacy that one 
view of the law may be good for all people at all times. Using specific 
commercial law examples, Professor Macdonald illustrates that the dif-
ferences among States, their legal architectures, their political and legal 
environments, and their adaptive capabilities make perfect harmonization 
or transplantation of law unattainable and, perhaps, undesirable. Like-
wise, the ability of a legal concept or norm to infect a legal community 
depends on a variety of factors, including the nature of the lawmaking 
authority (e.g., highly centralized, hierarchically organized, or legisla-
tively, rather than judicially, driven); the points of entry (e.g., agencies or 
scholarly communities); and the relationship of the State to other coun-
tries and ideology. These metaphors help us understand how States are 
inseparable from their social, economic, and political contexts. In doing 
so, we realize that international norm generation cannot be based on the 
unique socioeconomic and political contexts of a few States. This over-
arching perspective informs all of the panels and Articles that follow. 
Our first panel focuses on commercial law. Henry Deeb Gabriel, De-
Van Daggett Professor of Law, Loyola University School of Law, New 
Orleans, articulates an important resource question: is creating nonbind-
ing general principles (soft law instruments) a worthwhile goal when 
there are scarce resources to generate norms? Noting the call for both 
harmonization and modernization, Professor Gabriel echoes the chal-
lenges identified by Professor Macdonald, positing soft law as a vehicle 
capable of avoiding pitfalls to harmonization. In particular, The Advan-
tages of Soft Law in International Commercial Law: The Role of 
UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and the Hague Conference explores how soft 
law serves important functions that hard law does not. Soft law is more 
helpful in achieving harmonization than hard law because of its flexibili-
ty. Professor Gabriel observes that with soft law there is “less conflict 
between the international and the domestic law compared to a binding 
convention.” Because soft law does not require adoption, it is “more 
easily and readily available for use.” 1 Additionally, it serves as the basis 
for further work, provides guiding principles, and fosters party autonomy 
and neutrality. These attributes, however, also give rise to some criti-
cism. Soft law instruments may offer less certainty because they are non-
binding. They may also suffer because a lack “of vetting, compromise, 
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and ultimate acceptance usually yields instruments acceptable to the var-
ious constituencies.”2 
Amelia H. Boss, Trustee Professor of Law, Drexel University, Earle 
Mack School of Law, focuses on electronic commerce to highlight sym-
biosis at work in norm development. In The Evolution of Commercial 
Law Norms: Lessons to be Learned from Electronic Commerce, she 
highlights that product and form (either soft or hard law) are not as im-
portant as process, particularly the “exchange of ideas, and the education 
that occurs during the drafting process.”3 Moreover, she reminds us that 
success is difficult to judge. Success is not simply a matter of adoption or 
implementation. By examining the relatively recent developmental histo-
ry of electronic commerce law, Professor Boss shows the process and 
mutual effect of national and international efforts. She also warns us of 
the dangers of this process, specifically fragmentation, when missteps 
occur in international norm development. 
Boris Kozolchyk, Evo DeConcini Professor of Law, James E. Rogers 
College of Law, University of Arizona, recounts the long history of soft 
law in commercial transactions in Modernization of Commercial Law: 
International Uniformity and Economic Development. He specifically 
notes that “the vitality and universality of a commercial law shaped by 
best practices are apparent in institutions that stretch back as far as the 
ancient Greek version of the maritime contract and security agreement.”4 
Legal culture is comprised not merely of the written positive law, but 
also of the attitudes towards commerce and the law, as well as the living 
law, i.e., how law is practiced. This last variable, how law is practiced, is 
crucial to the success of law. 
Our second panel focuses on taxation norms. Hugh J. Ault, Professor 
of Law, Boston College School of Law; Senior Advisor, Centre for Tax 
Policy and Administration, OECD Paris, delves into the process by 
which the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) develops international tax norms. In particular, he tracks the 
changes in OECD structure and functioning. His Article, Reflections on 
the Role of the OECD in Developing International Tax Norms, considers 
tax competition, dispute resolution, and taxation of services. Professor 
Ault reveals that the OECD process has become more open and inclu-
sive, perhaps at the cost of its ability to reach consensus. In light of these 
changes, he suggests means by which the OECD may further its agenda. 
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He cautions that it will be necessary for the OECD to develop techniques 
for securing “agreement on policy principles and technical rules” while 
still allowing an “escape valve” for certain sensitive issues.5 
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Irwin I. Cohn Professor of Law, University of 
Michigan Law School, considers the subjects of tax havens and tax com-
petition in order to explore norm development. His Article, The OECD 
Harmful Tax Competition Report: A Retrospective After a Decade, ar-
gues that the OECD has dealt successfully with preferential tax regimes, 
but reminds us that this is an ongoing process. He suggests additional 
mechanisms by which the OECD members can promote norms that com-
bat tax competition. 
Lisa Philipps, Associate Professor of Law and incoming Associate 
Dean (Research, Graduate Studies, and Institutional Relations), Osgoode 
Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, Canada and Miranda Ste-
wart, Associate Professor of Law, Melbourne Law School, University of 
Melbourne, Australia conclude our tax discussion by tackling transpa-
rency norms in the budgetary context. In Fiscal Transparency: Global 
Norms, Domestic Laws, and the Politics of Budgets, they contend that the 
discursive roots of fiscal transparency stem from the shifts toward neoli-
beralism and good governance. Emphasizing fiscal discipline as well as 
accountability, participation, and ownership concerns, these movements 
were facilitated by numerous global initiatives: the International Mone-
tary Fund Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency, the OECD 
Best Practices for Budget Transparency, the World Bank, and the OECD 
and EU Stability Growth Pact. Philipps and Stewart consider how vari-
ous transparency mechanisms account for “issues of distributive impact 
and politics.”6 Ultimately, while recognizing the emerging international 
architecture for transparency, they urge us to acknowledge the need to 
promote transparency and inclusiveness on the State level. 
Our final subject is financial regulation. Kern Alexander, Director of 
Research in Financial Regulation, University of Cambridge, explores 
international banking supervision and, in particular, the Basel Commit-
tee. His Article, Global Financial Standard Setting, the G10 Committees, 
and International Economic Law, examines the soft law emanating from 
the Basel Committee, as well as other G10 committees, and its signifi-
cant public policy influence. He also examines the decision-making 
process that resulted in Basel II and its weaknesses. While these stan-
dards are “voluntary,” Doctor Alexander explains that the pressure on 
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States to adopt them raises serious accountability and legitimacy issues, 
and further suggests that the imposition of these standards on States ex-
cluded from their development could have negative consequences. 
In The Hardening of Soft Law in Securities Regulation, Roberta S. 
Karmel, Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School and Claire 
R. Kelly, Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School, argue that soft law 
counteracts regulatory competition and makes regulatory cooperation 
more palatable. They trace a long history of soft law securities regulation 
and detail the current international efforts to shape international soft law 
norms. While they see this continued process as desirable, they nonethe-
less identify problems with international norm development via soft law, 
namely, those of authority, process, and legitimacy. 
Finally, Elizabeth F. Brown, Assistant Professor, J. Mack Robinson 
College of Business, Georgia State University, explains the problem of 
developing international insurance norms. Professor Brown’s Article, 
The Development of International Norms for Insurance Regulation, notes 
that there is a great deal of pressure for international insurance standards, 
but they have not kept pace with other international financial regulatory 
efforts. Existing sources of international law (e.g., GATS, NAFTA) fall 
short, in large part, due to U.S. reservations made to these agreements. 
And, in fact, some of the principles espoused by these agreements—
notably, national treatment and market access—are not fully supported 
by state legislation. Still, the International Association of Insurance Su-
pervisors has tried to develop guiding principles. Its efforts have been 
thwarted by the complexity of negotiation due to the number of U.S. 
states involved. Given the federalism issue posed by U.S. participation, it 
is difficult to imagine the development of an internationally based con-
sensus. 
These symposium Articles, and the Symposium itself, raise many is-
sues for those interested in international norm generation. First, the 
process of international norm generation is just that, a process. It is ongo-
ing, dynamic, and interconnected. And it cannot be isolated from politics 
or socioeconomic pressures. Further, questions regarding legitimacy, 
accountability, power, and transparency are unavoidable. 
Second, the reach of soft law and the role it plays in international norm 
generation are remarkably extensive. Soft law serves a variety of values. 
Quite obviously, it may harden into positive hard law. More importantly, 
perhaps, is the role it plays in allowing for a symbiotic process of norm 
generation. It allows different legal cultures, perspectives, and values to 
coexist. More profoundly, it lays the groundwork for regulatory coopera-
tion among States. 
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Third, we see that international norm generation reflects the needs and 
conduct of the actors affected by the norms. When these rules fail to ac-
count for the needs and values of the constituencies they serve, they fail 
to take hold, and lose whatever legitimacy they may have had. 
Lastly, we see that national constituencies and domestic political pres-
sures can thwart the formation of general principles and universal norms. 
Moreover, the diversity of interests and approaches harkens back to the 
note struck by Professor Macdonald at the very beginning:  
Law is both a constant process of interaction between citizens and offi-
cials, and in international affairs, a constant process of adjustment 
among States conceived in dyadic interaction. If we are genuinely 
committed to “generating international legal norms,” then we can do no 
better than attend to Aristotelian wisdom: far from ruling the world, we 
will first be seeking to rule ourselves.7 
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